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INTRODUCTION

The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability has created a
great stir around the country.' Some Courts have begun to adopt the Restatement (Third), while others have declined to do so.' Similarly, the response by commentators to the Restatement (Third) has been mixed; while
some laud it for the uniformity it would bring to the law, others have criti1. Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., Forward to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY, at xv, xvi (1998) (Restatement (Third)) (acknowledging that in some areas, the

reporters set forth some concepts that were not well settled principles of law and, consequently did more than simply restate or codify the law followed in a majority of jurisdictions).
See James Henderson & Aaron Twerski, The Products Liability Restatement in the
2.
Courts: An Initial Assessment, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 7 (2000) (explaining the status of
portions of the Restatement (Third) in the courts).
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cized it for being too difficult of a burden on the plaintiffs.3 Despite the
criticism, portions of the Restatement (Third) have begun to see gradual acceptance. 4 Wyoming has not adopted any portion of the Restatement (Third)
since its publication in 1998.' This is not surprising, as Wyoming has gener-

ally been slower than the rest of the country in addressing issues related to
6

products liability law. Much of the problem stems from the sheer lack of
products liability cases that arise in Wyoming.7

This comment will examine the potentially problematic issues surrounding the Restatement (Third). Specifically, this comment will closely
examine the issues surrounding the adoption of Section 2 of the Restatement

(Third), focusing on the requirement of a reasonable alternative design found
in Section 2(b). Most states have struggled with this aspect of the Restate-

ment (Third).' Other issues that generally will be examined include the open

and obvious danger rule, and the interplay between failure to warn issues

and design defect issues found in Restatement (Third). Finally, this comment will determine whether adoption of the Restatement (Third) would
provide uniformity and consistency for Wyoming law, or whether it would
be merely redundant.
BACKGROUND

. BriefHistory of ProductsLiability Law
A. The Beginning of Products Liability

Products liability, unlike other areas of law, has a relatively short
history. Originally, a person injured by a product had no cause of action
against a manufacturer unless that person was in privity of contract with the

3.
See John F. Vargo, The Emperors New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns
a "New Cloth "for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects - A Survey of the States
Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493, 507-19 (1996) (criticizing the Restatement (Third) as too difficult of a burden on the plaintiffs); Denny Shupe & Todd Steggerda,
Toward a More Uniform and "Reasonable" Approach to Products Liability Litigation: Current Trends in the Adoption of the Restatement (Third) and its Potential Impact on Aviation
Litigation, 66 J. AIR L. & CoM. 129, 166 (2000) (stating that the Restatement (Third) shows
great promise for restoring the needed predictability, consistency, and rationality to products
liability law).
4.
See Henderson, supra note 2, at 8.
5.
See Covington v. Grace-Conn. Inc., 952 P.2d 1105 (Wyo. 1998); Campbell v. Studer,
Inc., 970 P.2d 389, 392 n.l (Wyo. 1998).
6.
See Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 341 n.8 (Wyo. 1986) (acknowledging that Wyoming is one of the last states to adopt strict liability in products liability actions).
7.
Vargo, supra note 3, at 948. The author only notices two relevant products liability
cases in Wyoming as of 1996. Id. at 948-49.
8.
Aaron Twerski & James Henderson, Introduction to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3, 4 (1998).
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manufacturer.9 American courts generally followed this rule, but have de-

veloped a number of exceptions.'0 The rule of privity in products liability
cases, however, remained steadfast until 1916."
In 1916, the landmark case of McPherson v. Buick Motor brought

about a significant change in products liability cases. 2 In McPherson, the
defendant, an automobile manufacturer, sold a vehicle to a retail dealer under privity of contract.' 3 The plaintiff bought the vehicle at the retail dealership and subsequently sued the defendant manufacturer after the car's
wooden wheel collapsed. 4 Justice Cardozo, finding for the plaintiff, extended the manufacturer's duty to all persons in fact harmed by products if
"the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and
limb in peril when negligently made"." Justice Cardozo further reasoned
that a manufacturer is negligent if it can foresee danger to the consumer
caused by the product it manufacturers. 6 He concluded that liability should
follow in this situation regardless of privity of contract."' McPherson
marked the first departure from the privity rule in American courts.' Most
9
American courts accepted the Cardozo analysis.'
Even with the publication of the Restatement of Torts, the negli2
gence rule set forth in McPherson remained intact for a period of time. "
The Restatement of Torts was an outgrowth of the 1920s, when products
Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). Plaintiff drove a coach serviced
9.
by the defendant. Id. The court held that since there was no privity of contract between the
parties, public policy dictated holding for the defendant. Id. at 403. The court stated "Unless
we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the
most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue." Id. at
405.
10. See Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 870-71 (8th Cir. 1903). The
three exceptions to the privity requirement are:
1) an act of negligence which is imminently dangerous to the life or
health of mankind, and which is committed in the preparation or sale of
an article intended to preserve, destroy, or affect human life,
2) an owner's act of negligence which causes injury to one who is invited
by him to use his defective appliance upon the owner's premises,
3) one who sells or delivers an article which he knows to be imminently
dangerous to life or limb to another without notice of its qualities.
Id. at 870-71.
Potter v.Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1327 (Conn. 1997).
11.
111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
12.
Id. at 1051.
13.
14.

Id.

15.
16.

Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1055.

17.
18.
19.

Id.
John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
Id.

20.

Shupe, supra note 3, at 131.
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liability law was in its infancy, and thus barely noted the existence of the
burgeoning field of products liability law.21 Throughout the years as society
and industry progressed, it became more and more difficult for the plaintiff
to prove his case.22 The close relationship between the manufacturer and the
consumer, which was once commonplace, began to disappear from the market landscape.2" Moreover, as manufacturers got larger, they kept their secrets closer.24 Plaintiffs no longer had the means or skill to investigate the
soundness of a product for themselves, and thus were required to rely on
manufacturers' disclaimers.2 5 Furthermore, this decreased accessibility to
manufacturers' information made it increasingly more difficult for plaintiffs
to prove manufacturer negligence.26
B. Strict Liability Realized
In response to the proof problems, plaintiffs increasingly relied on
the negligence doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in products liability cases.27 Res
ipsa loquitur does not apply unless: 1) the defendant had exclusive control
over the thing causing the injury, and 2) the accident is of such a nature that
it ordinarily would not occur in the absence of negligence by the defendant.2"
21.

Harvey S. Perlman & Gary Schwartz, GeneralPrinciples, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y

8 (2000).
22. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
23.
Id. at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring).
24.
Id. (Traynor, J., concurring).
25.
See Crist v. Art Metal Works, 175 N.E. 341 (N.Y.1931); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,
12 P.2d 409 (Wash. 1932) (excusing liability to dealer because of a disclaimer).
26. Escola, 150 P.2d at 443.
27.
See generally Payne v. Rome Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 73 S.E. 1087 (Ga. App. Ct.
1912); Bradley v. Conway Springs Bottling Co., 118 P.2d 601 (Kan. 1941); Ortego v. Nehi
Bottling Works, 6 So. 2d 677 (La. 1942); Macres v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 287 N.W. 922
(Mich. 1939); Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, 271 S.W. 497 (Mo. 1925); McPherson v. Canada
Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 29 A.2d 868 (N.J. 1943). All these cases dealt with exploding bottles
and apparent negligence on the part of the bottling company where the plaintiff used res ipsa
loquitur and prevailed.
28.
Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 140 P.2d 369, 370 (Cal. 1943). Some courts applying res
ipsa loquitur, however, still did not did not find liability in some cases where, under a strict
liability regime, a manufacturer would normally be liable. For courts applying res ipsa loquitur, but failing to find manufacturer liability where under strict liability the manufacturer
would be liable, see generally Stewart v. Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 68 P.2d 952 (Ariz.

1937) (holding that the negligent act was not under the defendant's control); Gerber v. Faber,
129 P.2d 485 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942) (reasoning that it was no more likely that the plaintiff
caused an explosion of a root beer bottle than the manufacturer); Berkens v. Denver CocaCola Bottling Co., 122 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1942) (exploding bottle attributable to other causes
other than negligence of the manufacturer); Slack v. Premier-PabstCorp., 5 A.2d 516 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1939) (dismissing plaintiff's claim because of a lack of specific facts of defendant's negligence); Loebig's Guardianv. Coca-ColaBottling Co., 81 S.W.2d 910 (Ky. 1935)

(refusing to draw inference that defendant controlled the product); Wheeler v. Laurel Bottling
Works, 71 So. 743 (Miss. 1916) (holding that res ipsa loquitur does not apply to unforeseen
accidents).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol3/iss1/7
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began to stir urging the replacement of negligence with strict liMurmurs
29
ability.
The idea of strict liability in products liability cases was first intro30
Cola Bottling Co.
in
duced the 1944 California decision of Escola v. Coca
In Escola, the plaintiff, a waitress, sued the defendant bottling company after
a soda bottle delivered to her employer by the defendant exploded in her
hand. 3 The majority held for the plaintiff using res ipsa loquitur principles.3 2 Justice Roger Traynor, however, in a concurring opinion urged the
33
adoption of strict liability in products liability actions. He reasoned that
"even if there is no negligence [on the part of the manufacturer] public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively
reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach
the market. '3 4 For Justice Traynor strict liability was the only way to approach a products liability case.
Although Justice Traynor was not in the majority in 1944, he wrote
35
for the majority twenty years later in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products.
In Greenman, the plaintiff sought damages against the manufacturer of a
36
combination power tool that could be used as a saw, drill, and wood lathe.
The plaintiff sued after he was injured when a piece of wood flew out of the
machine while he was using it.37 The trial court found that the setscrews
were inadequate, and normal vibration caused the tailstock of the lathe to
move away from the piece of wood being shaped, permitting portions of
wood to fly out of the lathe.3' The California Supreme Court held the manufacturer strictly liable because its defective product caused injury to the
plaintiff.39 The Greenman court set forth the prima facie case for strict liability actions against the manufacturer: "1) Plaintiff was injured, 2) While
using the product in a way it was intended to be used, 3) As a result of defect
and manufacture, 4) Made the product unsafe for its intended
in design
'4
use.

Following Greenman, the publication of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts (Restatement (Second)) further persuaded most of the country to fol29.
ring).
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurId. (Traynor, J., concurring).
Id. at 437 (Traynor, J., concurring).
Id. at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
Id. (Traynor, J., concurring).
Id. at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
Id. at 898.
Id.
Id. at 899.
Id. at 900.
Id. at 901.
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low California's reasoning.4 Section 402A of the Restatement (Second),
setting forth the strict liability rule in Greenman, has been one of the most
influential Restatement sections ever written.42 Every state supreme court
has addressed Section 402A in some form, even if it ultimately decided to
take a position different from the section itself.4 As a result of Section

402A, most of the country has adopted strict liability as set forth in the
Restatement (Second)."
Over the years, courts developed many diverse ways to interpret
Section 402A.45 As a result, the American Law Institute (ALl) decided to
revisit the Restatement (Second) in the early 1990s. 4' The Restatement
(Third) was published in 1998. Since 1998, states have had few opportunities to consider the propositions set forth in the Restatement (Third). Products liability law today stands at a crossroads, not knowing to which Restatement to look for guidance.
II. Restatement Analysis
The Restatements of the law are a product of the twentieth century.47 The First Restatement of Torts was published in 1938.4 It said nothing about products liability law.4 9 In 1965, the ALl, led by William Prosser,
completed the Restatement (Second), Volume 1L" It contained Section
402A, which proposed strict liability in products liability cases." Section
402A is the only section devoted to products liability in the Restatement
(Second).52 Finally, the Restatement (Third) arrived in 1998."3 The Restatement (Third) seeks to address many of the products liability issues the
authors of Section 402A had not even contemplated.14 It is a complete overhaul of the Restatement (Second) with regards to products liability."

41.
Harvey S. Perlman, Delaware and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: ProductsLiability, 2 DEL. L. REV. 179 (1999).
42.
Id.
43.
Id.
44.
See generally Vargo, supra note 3, at 589-99, 918-19 (noting that the only two states
that have yet to adopt strict liability in products liability cases are Delaware and Virginia).
45.
Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALl Restatement
Project,48 VAND. L. REV. 631 (1995); Shupe, supra note 3, at 132.
46.
Perlman, supra note 41, at 183.
47.
See Perlman, supra note 21, at 8.
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
51.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1995).
52.
Perlman, supra note 21, at 8.
53.
THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998).
54.
Aaron Twerski & James Henderson, Introduction to THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY

55.

3 (1998).

Id. at4.
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A. Section 402A Analysis
Originally Section 402A sought "to eliminate privity so that a user
or consumer, without having to establish negligence, could bring an action
against a manufacturer."56 Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
57
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Section 402A sets forth three basic product liability actions where strict liability would apply: manufacturing defects, design defects, and failure to
warn cases." Courts around the country universally adopted strict liability
actions in these types of cases.59 From its inception, however, Section 402A
lacked the detail necessary to guide the doctrine of strict liability beyond its
infancy.' As a result, courts varied greatly in their interpretation of Section
402A. Section 402A had other problems as well. Courts had difficulty de6
Other probfining the terms "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous."
lems include the lack of direction concerning liability for inadequate warnings and instructions, along with determining the proper test to apply in de56.

Id. at 3.

57.
58.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A (1965).

Shupe, supra note 3, at 132.

Id.
59.
Idat 131-32.
60.
See George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) Of Torts:
61.
Products Liability, 109 YALE L.J. 1087 (2000) (discussing the objective in Restatement
(Third) to resolve the problem of the meaning of the word 'defect,' a problem that has
haunted the law of torts since Section 402A of the ALI's 1965 Restatement (Second) ushered
in the era of strict liability for defective products).
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sign defect cases.62 Nevertheless, Section 402A has been called "the most
widely accepted distillation of the common law of torts."63
States interpreted Section 402A in a variety of different ways, straying from the original intent of the drafters." In design defect cases, for example, states developed three different types of tests to determine a defect:
the consumer expectations test, the risk utility test, and a combination of the
two tests. 65 The three tests were developed because Restatement (Second)
gave no guidance as to what to do in a design defect case.' The departure
from the original intent of Section 402A, necessarily, did not please the
drafters of the Restatement (Second).67 The Restatement (Third) was published to clarify what the drafters had intended in the Restatement (Sec68
ond).
B. Restatement (Third) Analysis
The Restatement (Third) seeks to clarify and to constrict the scope
of products liability law as it has evolved in the United States over the past
thirty-five years. 69 Admittedly, the authors of the Restatement (Third)
sought to straighten the development of Section 402A." The Restatement
(Third) was adopted by the ALl membership without a dissenting vote in
1997.71 Unlike Section 402A, which is only one section with limited commentary, the Restatement (Third) contains twenty-one separate sections with
extensive commentary." Up to this point, however, its reception in courts
has been lukewarm at best."
The most significant controversy surrounding the Third Restatement
lies within the language of Section 2. Section 2 states:

62.

See Shupe, supra note 3, at 131-32; James A. Henderson & Aaron Twerski, Products

Liability, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 21 (2000).

63.
Thomas V. Van Flein, Prospective Application of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability in Alaska, 17 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 2 (2000).
64.
Shupe, supra note 3, at 131.
65.
Potter v.Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1329 (Conn. 1997).
66.
Shupe, supra note 3, at 131.
67.
Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT
LIABILITY, at xv (1998).
68.
Shupe, supra note 3, at 130.
69.
Id. at 131.
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
72.
Henderson, supra note 2, at 8.
73.
See generally Vargo, supra note 3 (challenging reporters claim that Draft Restatement
[Third]'s reasonable alternative design constitutes a consensus among jurisdictions).
74.
Henderson, supra note 2, at 9; Shupe, supra note 3, at 135; Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1331 (Conn. 1997).
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A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate instructions or
warnings. A product:
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended design even though all possible care
was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product;
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design
by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe;
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of
reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other
distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the instructions or warnings
75
renders the product not reasonably safe.
76
Section 2 makes a tripartite-type division for defective products.
First are manufacturing defects, where the products fail to meet the manufacturer's own standards, such as the Coke bottle in the Escola case." Second
are design defects. A design defect occurs when the manufacturer intended
the product to go out on the market as designed, but because the design itself
7
was faulty or poor, the product injured a consumer. ' Liability in design
defect cases is defined in terms of whether the manufacturer reasonably
7
could have provided a safer product. ' Finally, failure to warn cases occur
when a manufacturer fails to warn about foreseeable risks or harms of its
product.80 A manufacturer generally has a duty to warn the consumer of the
8
possible risks its product may create. As in design defect cases, liability in
failure to warn cases is defined in terms of foreseeability and reasonable-

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

2 (1998).
Henderson, supra note 62, at 22.
Id.
David Owen, Products LiabilityRestated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273, 284 (1998).
Id.
Id. at 285.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §
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ness.82 The three liability standards in Section 2 provide the foundation for
most modem products liability law."3
Previously, when applying Section 402A, courts around the country
adopted three different tests for deciding design defect cases: a risk utility
test, a consumer expectation test, or the combination of the two." The drafters of Restatement (Third) only adopted the risk utility analysis followed by
some jurisdictions.8 5
1) Risk Utility Test
The traditional risk utility test states that a product is defective and
its design embodies excessive preventable danger unless "the benefits of the

design outweigh the risks inherent in such a design."

6

Generally, the risk

utility analysis involves a weighing of a number of relevant factors. All de-

cisions involve weighing the advantages and disadvantages of a contem-

plated course of action.87 The most common form of the risk utility test involves:

A balancing of the probability and seriousness of the harm
against the costs of taking precautions. Relevant factors to
be considered include the availability of alternative designs,
the cost and feasibility of adopting alternative designs, and
the frequency or infrequency of injury resulting from the de88
sign.
Many states have adopted the risk utility test for design defect cases.89

82.
Owen, supra note 78, at 285.
83.
Id. at 282.
84.
See Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 879 (Ariz. 1985) (applying the third test
- a combination of both risk utility and consumer expectations); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co.,
573 P.2d 443, 452 (Cal. 1978) (stating two tests for design defect liability (1)the consumer
expectation analysis (which states a manufacturer is strictly liable for any condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer that will be unreasonably dangerous to the consumer),
and (2) a balancing test that inquires whether a product's risks outweigh its benefits (risk
utility)). See also Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1331 (Conn. 1997).
85.
Henderson, supra note 62, at 22.
86.
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 452 (Cal. 1978).
87.
Harold P. Green, Cost - Risk-Benefit Assessment and the Law: Introduction and
Perspective,45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 901, 903 (1977).
88.
Raney v. Honeywell, Inc., 540 F.2d 932, 935 (8th Cir. 1976).
89.
See, e.g., Peck v. Bridgeport Mach., Inc., 237 F.3d 614 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying
Michigan law); White v. Smith and Wesson Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 816 (N.D. Ohio 2000)
(applying Ohio law); Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 183 (Colo. 1992); Warner
Fruehauf Trailer Co., Inc., v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1276 (D.C. 1995); Radiation Tech., Inc.
v. Ware Constr. Co., 445 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1983); Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450
S.E.2d 671 (Ga. 1994); Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980);
St. Germain v. Husqvama Corp., 544 A.2d 1283, 1286 (Me. 1986); Sperry-New Holland v.
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Peck v. Bridgeport Machines, a case decided by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, applying Michigan law, is a good
9
illustration of the risk utility test applied in a design defect setting. " In
Peck, the plaintiff was injured when his hand was inadvertently caught in a
lathe that was accidentally activated. 9 The plaintiff claimed that the lever
92
which put the lathe into gear was defectively designed. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals panel held that before the plaintiff could proceed under a
risk utility analysis, the plaintiff must produce evidence of the "magnitude of
the risks involved and the reasonableness of the proposed alternative design."93 To survive a motion for summary judgment under this formulation
of risk utility, the plaintiff must show:
(1) that the severity of the injury was foreseeable by the
manufacturer;
(2) that the likelihood of [the] occurrence of the injury was
foreseeable by the manufacturer at the time of the distribution of the product;
(3) that there was a reasonable alternative available;
(4) that the available alternative design was practicable;
(5) that the available and practicable reasonable alternative
design would have reduced the foreseeable risk of harm
posed by the defendant's product; and
(6) that the omission of the available and practicable reasonable alternative design rendered the defendant's product not
reasonably safe.94
The plaintiffs experts testified that they would have designed the lever differently, but admitted that they had never seen or made any of their proposed
alternative designs for the lever.95 Therefore, the court held that the plain-

Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 255 (Miss. 1993); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843
(N.H. 1978); Foley v. Clark Equip. Co., 523 A.2d 379 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Ford Motor Co.
v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377, 386 (Tex. 1998).
237 F.3d 614 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying Michigan law).
90.
Id. at 616. A lathe is a machine used for cutting and shaping metal. Id. The plaintiff
91.
was injured while loading a long medal tube into the lathe. Id. The switch was inadvertently
turned on and the plaintiff's hand was caught inside. Id. at 617.
Id.
92.
Idat 617.
93.
Id at 617-18.
94.
Id. at 618.
95.
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tiffs proposed alternative design was not feasible and the plaintiffs claim
failed.96
2) ConsumerExpectations Test
In addition to the risk utility test, a minority of jurisdictions apply a
consumer expectations test to determine the outcome of products liability
suits alleging a design defect.97 Defective condition is defined, under the
most common formulation of the consumer expectations test, as "dangerous
to an extent that would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics."9 8
Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., is an illustration of the consumer expectations test in practice.9 9 In Potter, the plaintiffs used the defendant's hand pneumatic tools over a span of twenty-five years. 0 The plaintiffs, in a class action, sued the manufacturer because they suffered from
permanent vascular neurological impairment as a result of using the pneumatic tools.' ' The Connecticut Supreme Court applied the consumer expectations test to the plaintiffs design defect claim. 2 The court considered a
number of factors to determine the expectations of the reasonable consumer,
including "the relative cost of the product, the gravity of the potential harm
from the claimed defect and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk to the consumer."' ' The court, applying these factors, held
that the pneumatic tools were unreasonably dangerous based on the ordinary
consumer expectation test, stating, "[I]t is not necessary that the plaintiff
establish a specific defect as long as there is evidence of some unspecified
dangerous condition."'0 4 Because the court found the tools' vibrations to be
a dangerous condition, the plaintiffs prevailed. °5

96.
Id.
97.
See French v. Grove, Mfg. Co., 656 F.2d 295, (8th Cir. 1981) (applying Arkansas
law); Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1334 (Conn. 1997); Ontai v.
Straub Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 659 P.2d 734, 735 (Haw. 1983); Delany v. Deere and Co., 999
P.2d 930, 944 (Kan. 2000) (stating that Kansas still adheres to the consumer expectations
test); Kudlacek v. Fiat, 509 N.W.2d 603 (Neb. 1994); Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 688
P.2d 1283 (Okla. 1984); Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2 (Wis.
1984).
98.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
99.
Potter,694 A.2d at 1319.
100.
Id. at 1325.
101.
Id. at 1325-26.
102.
Id. at 1333.
103.
Id.
104. Id. at 1335.
105.
Idat 1336.
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3) Multifactor Tests
While most jurisdictions adhere to either one or the other of the tests
0 6 This confor determining design defect cases, some states use both tests.
cept was introduced in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., wherein the California Supreme Court established two alternative tests for determining design
defect liability.0 7 The Court stated that a design is defective:
(1) if the product has failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or
reasonably foreseeable manner, or,
(2) if, in light of the relevant factors, the benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh the risk of danger inherent in
such design.'0°
The consumer expectations test is reserved for cases involving the
product user's typical experience, which permits a conclusion that the prod09
uct's design violated minimum safety assumptions.' Risk utility applies if
the product's design embodies excessive preventable danger, unless the
benefits of the design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such a design." ° The crucial question in design defect cases is "whether the circumstances of the product's failure permit an inference that the product's design
performed below the legitimate, commonly accepted minimum safety assumptions of its ordinary consumers.'
4) The Requirement of a Reasonable Alternative Design
Unlike Restatement (Second) Section 402A, the Restatement (Third)
makes a "reasonable alternative design" a requirement in design defect
cases." 2 At the time of the Restatement (Third)'s adoption, only a limited
number of jurisdictions required a reasonable alternative design in products

See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg.,
106.
Inc., 709 P.2d 876 (Ariz. 1985); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); Halliday
v. Sturm, Ruger, & Co., Inc., 792 A.2d 1145-46 (Md. 2002); Knitz v. Minister Mach. Co.,
432 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 1982); Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chem. Corp., 7 P.3d 795 (Wash.
2000).
107. Barker, 573 P.2d at 446.
108. Id.
Daniel J. Herling, The Continuing Erosion of the 'Consumer Expectations' Test in
109.
Design Defect Claims, 20 NO. 9 LJN's PROD. LIAB. L. & STRATEGY, March 2002, at 1.
110. Barker, 573 P.2d at 454.
Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 309 (Cal. 1994).
111.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998).
112.
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liability cases." 3 Most of the country has yet to adopt this position, but it is
slowly gaining acceptance.' 14
A design defect exists under Restatement (Third) when there is a
reasonable alternative design that could have reduced or avoided the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product, and the product is not safe because of the omission of the alternative design." 5 Plaintiffs can establish a

reasonable alternative design either by developing a working prototype using

expert testimony, or by comparing the defendant manufacturer's design to

similar designs in the same field used by another manufacturer." 6 Assessment of a product design in most instances requires a comparison between
an alternative design and the product design that caused the injury from the
viewpoint of a reasonable person." 7
Although the language of Restatement (Third) Section 2 appears to
require the plaintiff, as a general rule, to prove a reasonable alternative design, the comments indicate that there are exceptions. The comments following Restatement (Third) Sections 2, 3 and 4 allow plaintiffs to avoid presenting a reasonable alternative design in certain circumstances." 8 Comment f to Section 2 states that a plaintiff need not establish an actual prototype of the proposed alternative design.' The plaintiff only needs qualified
expert testimony to prove the possibility of a reasonable alternative design
even though no prototype exists.'20 Moreover, Sections 3 and 4 take notice

of the multifactor tests, present in a few states, which do not always require a
reasonable alternative design in defect cases.'

113.
See General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176, 1191 (Ala. 1985); Owens v.
Allis-Chalmers Corp., 326 N.W.2d 372 (Mich. 1982); Voss v. Black and Decker, Mfg. Co.,
450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983); Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 335
(Tex. 1998); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-2104 (West Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:2800.56 (1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (f)(ii) (2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2307.75 (F) (West 1994).
114. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 12-13 (listing the courts which have treated Section
2(b) favorably, and those which already require a reasonable alternative design, but have not
yet adopted Section 2(b)).

115.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY

§ 2(b) (1998).

116. Id. § 2 cmt. d.
117.
Id.
118.
See id. § 2 cmt. b. There are several occasions where a reasonable alternative design
is not required. Id. Comment e to Section 2 addresses products with such a high degree of
danger that no reasonable alternative design is required. Id. § 2 cmt. e. Section 3 provides
that when circumstantial evidence supports the conclusion that a defect was a contributing
cause of harm and that the defect existed at the time of the sale, it is unnecessary to meet
Section 2's requirements. Id. § 3. Section 4 states that no reasonable alternative design is
required when a product violates a statutory norm. Id. § 4.
119.
Henderson, supra note 2, at 13.
120.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. f (1998).
121.
Sixteen jurisdictions hold that a feasible alternative design is merely one of several
factors in a design defects case. See Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876 (Ariz. 1985);
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5)OtherIssues
In addition to the reasonable alternative design requirement, Section
2 presents other issues. Section 2 eliminates the traditional rule that a manufacturer has no duty to design against open and obvious dangers.' 22 The
principle of open and obvious danger states that if a "product is designed so
that it is reasonably safe for the use intended, the product is not defective
even though capable of producing injury where the injury results from an
obvious or patent peril."' 2 3 Whether a danger is open and obvious depends
on an "objective view of the product; the user's perception is irrelevant."' 24
This rule had fallen into disrepute over the last two decades prior to adoption
of the Restatement (Third).'25 Most jurisdictions now state that open and
obvious danger is but one factor to consider when determining a product's
reasonableness.' 26 Some states, however, still hold to this position, mainly
because no case has arisen within their jurisdiction addressing this issue.' 27
Another issue in Section 2 is the lack of duty to warn about obvious
dangers. 2 Generally, manufacturers have no duty to warn about obvious
dangers. 29 Although this is not an automatic defense, it offers some relief to
the manufacturer. 30 This position, articulated in Comment j to Section 2,

Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 741 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1987); Warner Fruehauf Trailer
Co. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272 (D.C. 1995); Radiation Tech., Inc. v. Ware Constr. Co., 445
So.2d 329 (Fla. 1983); Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. 1994); Montgomery
Elevator Co. v. McCollough, 676 S.W.2d 776 (Ky. 1984); McCourt v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc.,
734 P.2d 696 (Nev. 1987); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978);
Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., Inc., 386 A.2d 816 (N.J. 1978); Brooks v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 902 P.2d 54 (N.M. 1995); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978);
Claytor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 286 S.E.2d 129 (S.C. 1982); Peterson v. Safeway Steel Scaffolds Co., 400 N.W.2d 909 (S.D. 1987); Momingstar v. Black & Decker, Mfg. Co., 253
S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d (1998).
122.
Weatherby v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 393 S.E.2d 64, 66 (Ga. 1990).
123.
Raymond v. Amada Co., Ltd., 925 F. Supp. 1572, 1577 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
124.
Henderson, supra note 2, at 13.
125.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d, reporter's notes
126.

(1998).
127. Id.
128. Id. §2 cmt.j.
129. See McMahon v. Bunn-o-Matic Corp., 150 F.2d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 1998) (relying on
comment j when holding that the defendant was not required to warn customers of obviously
hot coffee); Maneely v. Gen. Motors Corp., 108 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing to
comment j in holding that "a manufacturer need not provide a warning" when dangers are
generally obvious); Sauder Custom Fabrication, Inc., v. Boyd 967 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Tex.
1998) (holding, in accordance with comment j, the manufacturer's duty to warn only extends
to that which is not obvious to the ordinary user); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379,
382 n.2 (Tex. 1995) ("The warnings of obvious risks tends to undermine the effectiveness of
warnings of unobvious risks.").
130. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. j, reporter's notes
(1998).
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remains consistent with the position taken in the Restatement (Second).13 1
The overwhelming amount of authority in the country follows Comment j.' 32
Additionally, Restatement (Third) Section 2 Comment I takes a position contrary to that of Restatement (Second) Section 402A.,3 3 The Restatement (Second) allowed a defendant manufacturer to warn its way out of a
design defect case. 3 4 Restatement (Third), however, does not allow defendant manufacturers to do this, clearly stating that "warnings are not ... a
substitute for the provision of a reasonably safe design."' 35 The drafters took

this position because it is consistent with the requirement of a reasonable

alternative design. 136 The drafters reasoned that if a reasonable alternative
design could have been adopted, the manufacturer should bear responsibility
even though it adequately warned against the danger.'37 Because little controversy surrounds the remaining sections of Restatement (Third), the analysis of this comment will focus exclusively on Restatement (Third) Section
2.138

1X. ProductsLiability In Wyoming
The law of products liability in Wyoming has taken a somewhat different course than much of the rest of the country. Wyoming still adhered to
the privity rule in 1963, even though most other jurisdictions by that time
had done away with this requirement. 139 Plaintiffs, however, were able to
overcome the rule in many ways, including by pleading the traditional negli-

131.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 cmt. k (1965) (noting the manufacturer has
no duty to warn of open and obvious dangers connected with an otherwise non-defective
product).
132. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. j, reporter's
notes (1998) (listing an extensive amount of caselaw that follows the open and obvious danger rule). But see Michael S. Jacobs, Toward a Process-BasedApproach to Failureto Warn
Law, 71 N.C. L. REv. 121 (1992); M. Stuart Madden, Duty to Warn in Products Liability:
Contours and Criticisms, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 221, 253-57 (1987).
133.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. 1 (1998);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965); Henderson, supra note 2, at 17.
134.
See Henderson, supra note 2, at 17; Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products,
and Cognitive Limitations, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1193, 1206-07 (1994); Aaron Twerski et al.,
The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Comes of Age, 61
CORNELL L. REV. 495, 506 (1976).
135.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. 1(1998).
136.
Henderson, supra note 2, at 17.
137.
Id.
138.
See Shupe, supra note 3. The authors barely mention the other sections of the Restatement (Third) during an extensive analysis of its provisions. Id. See also Henderson,
supra note 62, at 24. The authors note that most of the rest of the Restatement (Third) has
stirred very little controversy. Id.
139.
Parker v. Heasler Plumbing & Heating Co., 388 P.2d 516, 518 (Wyo. 1963) (stating
that a danger other than one of common knowledge must be present in order to impose upon a
manufacturer a duty to warn).
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gence doctrine res ipsa loquitur.'4° Under Wyoming law, however, it is extremely difficult for a plaintiff to prevail on an action using res ipsa loquitur.'4' If the plaintiff can point to any specific acts of negligence by the defendant, then res ipsa loquitur is not available. 42 Until 1986, negligence
actions were virtually the only cause
of action that purchasers not in privity
4
with the manufacturer could bring. 1
Under the negligence rule, remote purchasers generally could not
win on a negligence claim in Wyoming due to difficulties in proof. The only
remedy available to remote purchasers without privity of contract was a
claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.'" In 1980, the
court lifted the privity requirement in UCC actions, reasoning that "a seller's
warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured by breach of the warranty."' 4 5 Although the case was limited to
transactions under the UCC, it was a step toward strict liability in tort actions. Until 1980, the Wyoming Supreme Court previously had been unclear
as to whether privity was required in tort actions based on the UCC. 46 After
140.
Estate of Coleman ex rel. Coleman v. Casper Concrete Co., 939 P.2d 233 (Wyo.
1997); Goddert v. Newcastle Equip. Co., Inc., 802 P.2d 157, 159 (Wyo. 1990) (limiting the
exclusive control requirement to whether or not the defendant could explain the occurrence);
Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Bunce 62 P.2d 1297 (Wyo. 1936) (adopting res ipsa loquitur,but
declining to apply it). The Wyoming rule on res ipsa loquitur is:
When a thing which causes injury, without fault of the injured person, is
shown to be under the exclusive control of the defendant, and the injury is
such as, in the ordinary course of things, does not occur if the one having
such control uses proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation, that the injury arose from the defendant's want of
care.
Coleman, 939 P.2d at 237-38.
141.
Langdon v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 494 P.2d 537, 540 (Wyo. 1972).
142.
Id.
143.
See Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 341 (Wyo. 1986) (adopting strict
liability in products liability). See also Wells v. Jeep Corp., 532 P.2d 595 (Wyo. 1975). The
court found for the defendant manufacturer in a design defect case noting, "Proof of nothing
more than that a particular injury would not have occurred had the product which caused the
injury been designed differently is insufficient to establish a breach of the manufacturer's or
seller's duty as to the design of the product." Id. at 597. See also Maxted v. Pacific Car &
Foundry Co., 527 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1974). Plaintiff sued both manufacturer and retailer, alleging failure to provide an adequate safety roll bar after tractor overturned. Id. at 833. The
court found for the defendant stating that the manufacturer owed no duty to the plaintiff because its product was not "unreasonably dangerous." Id. at 836. The court also declined to
adopt strict liability. Id.
144.
W. Equip. Co., Inc. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., 605 P.2d 806, 810 (Wyo. 1980);
Continental Motors Corp. v. Joly, 483 P.2d 244 (Wyo. 1971).
145.
W. Equip., 605 P.2d at 808-09.
146.
Id. at 810; Parker v. Heasler Plumbing & Heating Co., 388 P.2d 516, 517 (Wyo.
1964). The court noted the lack of privity of contract in failure to warn case, but did not
decide on the issue. Id. Subsequent decisions, however, have allowed actions without privity
of contract, but did not clearly decide on the issue. See Wells v. Jeep Corp., 532 P.2d 595
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the court extended liability in UCC actions, other independent tort actions
soon followed.

Also, it was not until 1978 that the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized that an automobile manufacturer should foresee the involvement of its
product in collisions.' 47 The rest the country recognized this fact after the
holding in McPherson in 1916 or soon thereafter.' 48 Moreover, reasonable
alternative designs were not accepted as evidence in negligence actions
against manufacturers until 1974.149 The rest of the country began accepting
reasonable alternative designs in the mid 1960's.1 50 Wyoming, however, did
not have a products liability case until 1963.15

A. Strict Liability in Wyoming
Although the Restatement (Second) recognized strict liability in
1965, the Wyoming Supreme Court declined on a number of occasions, to
adopt strict liability in products liability actions. 52

(Wyo. 1975); Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 527 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1974); Shipton
Supply Co. v. Bumbaca, 505 P.2d 591 (Wyo. 1973); Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, 382 P.2d
886 (Wyo. 1963).
147.
Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123, 1129 (Wyo. 1978). The court held that
after the seat bracket broke during an automobile collision, the defendant manufacturer has
the duty of a reasonable and prudent man designing an automobile. Id. Therefore, a reasonable man would anticipate collisions and the manufacturer had a duty to design against them.
Id.; see also Maxted, 527 P.2d at 833-34. In Maxted, the court allowed proof of design but
noted that lack of workable prototype hurt its credibility. Id.
148.
See Wade, supra note 18, at 5 (noting that most of the country had adopted the
McPherson reasoning by 1965).
149.
Maxted, 527 P.2d at 832. The plaintiffs offered a reasonable alternative design to the
coupling device that held a tractor and trailer together. Id.
150.
Guerdon Indus., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 123 N.W.2d 143 (Mich. 1963);
McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1967); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Triplett,
139 So. 2d 357 (Miss. 1962); Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 199 A.2d 826
(N.J. 1964); Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806 (Or. 1967); Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d
853 (Pa. 1966); Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965);
Detrick v. Garretson Packing Co., 440 P.2d 834 (Wash. 1968).
151.
Parker v. Heasler Plumbing & Heating Co., 388 P.2d 516, 517 (Wyo. 1963)
152.
See Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089, 1094 (Wyo. 1985); O'Donnell v. City of Casper,
696 P.2d 1278, 1288 (Wyo. 1985); Herman v. Speed King Mfg. Co., 675 P.2d 1271, 1276
(Wyo. 1984); Caldwell v. Yamaha Motor Co., 648 P.2d 519, 521 (Wyo. 1982) (applying
Section 402A as law of the case, but declining to adopt as law of the state); Wells, 532 P.2d at
597; Maxted, 527 P.2d at 834.
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The development of Wyoming's products liability law has been
much slower than the rest of the country because there have been very few
opportunities for the Wyoming court to make any significant changes in the
law. ' The first products liability case was FordMotor Co. v. Arguello, in
which the court first indicated that privity of contract was not required in a
products liability case.' 54 One year later, in Parker v. HeaslerPlumbing and
Heating Co., the plaintiff was saddled with an additional burden in a products liability case when it was required to prove a latent defect in a duty to
warn case.'55 Following Parker,the court declined to apply res ipsa loquitur
in Langdon v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. because the plaintiff proved
specific acts of negligence. 3 6 In 1974, the court declined to adopt Section
402A in Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., and dismissed the case due
to a lack of a reasonable alternative design prototype.' 57 After Maxted, the
court decided Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich. 58 In Todorovich, the court
recognized the duty of an auto manufacturer to anticipate collisions.'59
Later, in 1980, the court eliminated the privity requirement in UCC products
liability cases in Western Equipment Co., Inc. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc. 60
'
153.
(Wyo.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See generally Parker, 388 P.2d at 516; Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, 382 P.2d 886
1963) (representing the first two products liability cases in Wyoming).
Arguello, 382 P.2d at 889.
Parker,388 P.2d at 517-18.
Langdon v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 494 P.2d 537, 540 (Wyo. 1972).
Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 527 P.2d 832, 836 (Wyo. 1974).
580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978).
Id. at 1129.
W. Equip. Co., Inc. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., 605 P.2d 806, 810 (Wyo. 1980).
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In 1985, the court on two occasions declined to adopt Section 402A in
O'Donnell v. City of Casperand Buckley v. Bell. 6'
Finally, in 1986, over a dissent by Justice Brown, the Wyoming Su-62
preme Court adopted strict tort liability in Ogle v. CaterpillarTractor Co. 1
In Ogle, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer after he fell from the hood of a
Caterpillar scraper he was operating. 63 The plaintiff brought claims in
breach of warranty, negligence, and strict liability."6 The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the breach of warranty action that was previously applied in product defect cases was inadequate, and all relevant policy pointed
to the adoption of strict liability in design defect, failure to warn, and manufacturing defect cases. 65 The Wyoming Supreme Court adopted the Restatement (Second) Section 402A in its entirety, including the comments, in
products liability cases. 166 Furthermore, the Wyoming Supreme Court remanded the Ogle case so it could be tried under a strict liability theory. 67
Although the Ogle court adopted strict liability, it also recognized6 the continued existence of negligence claims in products liability actions. 1
B. Post Ogle Decisions
Since the Ogle decision, the Wyoming Court has handled various issues surrounding the application of Section 402A. The court, however, has
yet to articulate whether it follows a consumer expectation or risk utility test
in design defect cases. In Sims v. General Motors Corp., a design defect
case from 1988, the plaintiff appealed an adverse judgment claiming error in
a jury instruction on "unreasonably dangerous."' 169 The instruction stated:
"A product is defective when it is in an unreasonably dangerous condition.
The term 'unreasonably dangerous' means unsafe when put to a use that is
reasonably foreseeable considering the nature and function of the product
and its uses"' 7 ° The plaintiff argued that the instruction was improper because it imposed a risk-utility theory. 7 ' The court subsequently held, "[W]e
admit that this Court does not follow a risk benefit theory, we cannot see
how the instruction given by the trial court imposed such a burden on plainO'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278, 1288 (Wyo. 1985); Buckley v. Bell, 703
161.
P.2d 1089, 1094 (Wyo. 1985).
162.
Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 341 (Wyo. 1986).
163.
Id. at 336.
164. Id.
165.
Id. at 343.
166.
Id. at 341.
167.
Id. at 346.
168.
Id.
169.
Sims v. Gen. Motors Corp., 751 P.2d 357, 364-65 (Wyo. 1988). Plaintiff's daughter
was injured after plaintiff's vehicle started on fire and her daughter's seat belt buckle failed to
open, causing the daughter's death. Id. at 359. Plaintiff alleged that the seat belt buckle was
defectively designed. Id.
170.
Id. at 365.
171.
Id.
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tiffs or the jury."'72 The court did not explicitly adopt either the consumer
expectations test or a combination of the risk utility and consumer expecta74
tions tests.173 Wyoming has yet to adopt a test since the Sims case.
Another post-Ogle decision that failed to take a position on what
standard to apply is Continental Insurance v. Page Engineering Co.' 75 In
Page, the plaintiff attempted to recover damages when a reeving block
failed, alleging design defect, failure to warn, and negligence. 176 The plaintiff sought to recover damages based on the damage to the reeving block
itself, and what it would cost to repair it. 7 7 The court, during this discussion, peripherally addressed what test to apply in an implied warranty of
merchantability action. The court, in dicta, stated, "What is true with respect
to strict liability and negligence, i.e. the risk associated with a product which
does not meet the expectations of a buyer is a risk better suited to resolution
by agreement between sophisticated bargaining parties."'' 7 ' Again, the court
left the issue of expectations up to the contracting parties and failed to take a
position on what test to apply in a design defect case. 17
A further development in Wyoming products liability law came in
McLaughlin v. Michelin Tire Corp.80 In McLaughlin, the court first stated
that strict liability in products liability cases should be used as a last resort.' 8'
Second, the court offered its version of the definition of defect, stating that
"a wrong product is not a defective product for purposes of strict liability."' 82
The court explained that the defect must be a "defect in fact" (i.e. the product itself failed), and not merely the wrong product for the situation.'83 Furthermore, the court noted that the focus in strict liability actions, unlike previous negligence actions, is on the product and not on the manufacturer's
actions.""

172.
Id.
173.
Id.
174.
Vargo, supra note 3, at 949.
175.
783 P.2d 641 (Wyo. 1989).
176.
Id. at 646. A reeving block is a component of a dragline used in open pit mining
operations. Id. at 645.
177.
Id. at 647.
178.
Id. at 650.
179.
Id.
180.
778 P.2d 59 (Wyo. 1989).
181.
Id. at 64.
182.
Id. at 65.
183.
Id. at 64.
184.
Id.
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C. Decisions Since Restatement (Third)'s Publication
The Wyoming Supreme Court has had only two occasions to adopt
the Restatement (Third) since its publication in 1998.185 In Covington v.
Grace-Conn., Inc., the plaintiff alleged that his lung cancer was caused by
exposure to asbestos insulation while at his place of employment.' 86 The
court failed to address the Restatement (Third), and instead decided the case
under the Wyoming Real Estate Statute of Repose."8 7 In Campbell v. Studer,
Inc., the plaintiff sued in strict liability when her husband died after being
ejected from an asphalt compacter. 88 Although Section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) applied, the court declined to adopt it because the specific facts
of the case did not give rise to the reasonable alternative design requirement.'89 The court hinted that on another occasion it may accept the Restatement (Third)'s summation of the law, stating that a reasonable alternative design may not be required to prove a defective design according to
comments b and e to Section 2.19' The requirement of a reasonable alternative design is the subject of the majority of criticism surrounding the Restatement (Third); however, the court chooses not to join in the criticism. 9 '
Regardless, Wyoming still follows Section 402A in products liability actions."'
The foregoing outlines the extent of the development of Products
Liability Law in Wyoming. Wyoming still follows the court's decision in
Ogle, which adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Second).'93 Wyoming does not have a clear test for design defect cases, adopting neither a
consumer expectation nor a risk utility test.' 94
ANALYSIS

The analysis section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of
adopting the Restatement (Third) in Wyoming. Specifically, the analysis
focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of both the risk utility test set

Campbell v. Studer, Inc., 970 P.2d 389 (Wyo. 1998); Covington v. W.R. Grace185.
Conn., Inc, 952 P.2d 1105 (Wyo. 1998).
Covington, 952 P.2d at 1106.
186.
187.
Id. at 1105. The Wyoming Statute of Repose is found in Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 1-3-111
(LExisNEXis 2001). The court decided this case under it because it dealt with manufactured
and furnished materials that were incorporated into real estate improvement. Covington, 952
P.2d at 1105.
Campbell, 970 P.2d at 390.
188.
189. Id. at 392 n. 1.
190. Id.
191.
Id. For criticisms of the Restatement (Third), see generally Vargo, supra note 3, at
518 (noting the difficulty plaintiffs will have in proving a reasonable alternative design).
Campbell, 970 P.2d at 392 n.1.
192.
Id..
193.
Vargo, supra note 3, at 949.
194.
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forth in Section 2(b) and the competing consumer expectations test. The
analysis also addresses why Wyoming should adopt the Restatement (Third).
I. Section 2(b): Risk Utility and Consumer Expectations: A Comparison
Section 2(b) was the cornerstone of the Restatement (Third) from its
inception.' 95 Design defect cases, with which Section 2(b) deals, are at the
center of products liability law.'96 Generally, a feasible alternative design
lies at the heart of a design defect case.' 97 This was the view taken by the
authors of the Restatement (Third) when drafting Section 2(b).'98
In courts today, however, there remain three different tests for design defect cases: the risk utility test, the consumer expectations test, and a
combination of the two.'
The risk utility test, the position taken by the
Restatement (Third), is followed in a majority of states. 2° Some courts continue to apply a combination of the two tests, using the consumer expectations test as a factor in design defect cases. 2 1 Other courts allow the plaintiff to choose which test to employ.2 °2 Finally, some courts only employ a
consumer expectation test to design defect cases.20 3 However, the overall

trend 20in4 the law is moving toward a risk utility analysis in design defect
cases.

195.
Jerry J. Phillips, Consumer Expectations, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1047, 1064 (2002); James
A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1520 (1992).
196.
DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 8:5 (3d. ed.
2000).
197. Id.
198.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998).
199.
Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1329 (Conn. 1997).
200.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d, reporter's
notes (1998).
201.
Herling, supra note 110, at 3 n. 1. Those states are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id.
202.
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Barker v. Lull Eng'g
Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hospital, Inc., 659 P.2d 734 (Haw.
1983); Lamkin v. Towner, 615 N.E.2d 1208 (I11.1993); Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc.,
792 A.2d 1145 (Md. 2002).
203.
Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1331 (Conn. 1997); Delaney
v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 946 (Kan. 2000); Green v. Smith & Nephew Co. AHP, Inc.,
629 N.W.2d 727, 751 (Wis. 2001).
204. See Warner Freuhauf Trailer Co., Inc., v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1276 (D.C. 1995)
(noting that in design defect cases, most jurisdictions decide strict liability in tort using some
form of risk-utility balancing test); Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. 1994);
Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980); St. Germain v.
Husqvama Corp., 544 A.2d 1283, 1286 (Me. 1988); Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So.
2d 248, 255 (Miss. 1993) (noting that risk utility has become the trend in most federal and
state jurisdictions); Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377, 386 (Tex. 1998).
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A. Application of Risk Utility and Consumer Expectations Test
The traditional risk utility test states that a product is defective and
its design embodies excessive preventable danger unless "the benefits of the
challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such a design."20 5
The trier of fact deciding a products liability case using the Restatement
(Third) Section 2(b) essentially has to answer one question: "Which is the
better design?"20 6 In answering this question, the trier of fact considers a
number of factors, including the availability of the alternative design, the
feasibility of the alternative design, the foreseeability of harm that may be
caused by the defendant's product without the design, and whether the omission of the reasonable alternative design made the defendant's product unsafe.20 7 Applying these factors can be quite difficult for jurors, especially
when the design is very technical and complicated.0 8
Like the risk utility test, the consumer expectations test may seem
The consumer
simple, but can be quite complicated in its application. 2'
expectations test states that a product is defective if it is "dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community
as to its characteristics., 2 " Taken in its most simplistic form, the trier of fact
must determine only what an "ordinary consumer" would believe about the
qualities of the product in question."' In order to determine consumer ex-

Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443,446-47 (Cal. 1978).
205.
206.
Henderson, supra note 62, at 23.
207.
See Peck v. Bridgeport Mach., 237 F.3d 614 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying Michigan law).
Examples of the difficulty of the risk utility test are the six factors the jury was asked to apply
in the Peck case. They are:
(1) that the severity of the injury was foreseeable by the manufacturer;
(2) that the likelihood of the occurrence of the injury was foreseeable by
the manufacturer at the time of the distribution of the product;
(3) that there was a reasonable alternative available;
(4) that the available alternative design was practicable;
(5) that the available and practicable reasonable alternative design would
have reduced the foreseeable risk of harm posed by the defendant's product; and
(6) that the omission of the available and practicable reasonable alternative design rendered the defendant's product not reasonably safe.
Id. at 617-18.
Henderson, supra note 62, at 23-24.
208.
209. See generally Richard L. Cupp., Jr., The "Uncomplicated" Law of Products Liability:
Reflections of a Professor Turned Juror, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1082 (1997) (stating that the
consumer expectations test is difficult to apply in design defect cases).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
210.
Vargo, supra note 7, at 539.
211.
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pectations, the trier of fact needs to take into account several factors, including "the relative cost of the product, the gravity of the potential harm from
the claimed defect, and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or minimizing
the risk [to the consumer]. 21 2 Additionally, it can be difficult for the trier of
fact to apply the consumer expectations in complex product liability cases
because such expectations lie beyond the knowledge of the average consumer.13 Both risk utility and consumer expectations tests can be exceedof the number of factors
ingly difficult to apply in certain situations because
2t 4
that should be weighed in order to reach a verdict.
B. Application in Design Defect Cases
Most of the contention surrounding the Restatement (Third) is found
in the design defect arena.25 Both the consumer expectations test and the
risk utility test have their advantages and disadvantages in design defect
cases. In a design defect case, the plaintiff is contending that the product has
been made precisely as intended, but is nevertheless defective because the
design is defective." 6 Though it is more difficult to apply the consumer
expectations test to design defects than manufacturing defects, the risk utility
test is not without its difficulties as well.217
The biggest advantage of the risk utility test is that it's balancing of
a particular product's costs and benefits makes it easier to apply in complex
design cases.2" 8 The consumer expectations test is difficult to apply to machines and technical products about which consumers have very little information." 9 In Soule v. GeneralMotors Corp., the plaintiff claimed that frame
and wheel assembly brackets of a Camaro were defectively designed, causing enhanced injury to the plaintiff driver during a collision. 220 The California Supreme Court held that the jury could not have meaningfully applied
the consumer expectations test because of the case's complexity.22 Ordinary experience and understanding, the court held, would not create expectations about the "precise behavior of several obscure components of [the
222
plaintiff's] car under the complex circumstances of a particular accident.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333 (Conn. 1997).
Phillips, supra note 195, at 1048-49.
Cupp, supra note 209, at 1083.
Henderson, supra note 62, at 22.

21.6.
Robert P. Murrian, Products Liability - Tennessee's Prudent Manufacturer Test, 67
TENN. L. REV. 307, 324 (2000).

217. See generally Vargo, supra note 3 (criticizing the application of risk utility in design
defect cases); Henderson, supra note 62 (criticizing the application of the consumer expectations test in design defect cases).
218. Perlman, supra note 41, at 198.
219. Id.
220. Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 301-02 (Cal. 1994).
221.
Id. at 310.
222. Id.
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The court noted that the consumer expectations test is reserved for cases
where the everyday experience of the product's users, permits, a conclusion
that the product's design violated minimum safety assumptions.223 Since
such complicated design considerations were at issue, and expert testimony
was necessary to illuminate how the design worked, the court held that the
consumer expectations test was improperly applied in the Soule case.224
Consumer expectations, on the other hand, can be applied in certain
design defect cases where risk utility cannot. Products, the use of which
exposes the consumer to inherent risks, are the best example of such a situation.225 These cases involve products such as cigarettes, alcoholic beverages,
and inexpensive handguns. These consumer products cause death or injury
to large numbers of users, but provide few countervailing benefits.226 These
products are so dangerous that they should be per se defective despite the
absence of a safer alternative design. 7 With these products, the dangerous
nature of the product is the essence of the product. For example, alcohol
intoxicates and, along with nicotine, is potentially addictive, and certain inexpensive handguns serve little purpose other than facilitating the commission of violent crime.228 Any alternative product that did not provide the
same effect would not be a true alternative. 2 9 In short, application of the
risk utility test would be impossible because there simply is no reasonable
alternative design a plaintiff can adopt in these cases that still intoxicates,
addicts, or assists in the commission of crime as accomplished by these
products.23 °
C. Plaintiffs Burden of Proof
The biggest problem critics and courts have had with the Restatement (Third) is not in the adoption of risk utility, but in the requirement of a
reasonable alternative design. 231 Generally, in order to prevail under a risk
utility analysis, plaintiffs have to prove the existence of a reasonable alternative design, although courts do not always strictly require it. 232 Plaintiffs
223. Id. at 309.
224. Id. at 310.
225.
William E. Westerbeke, The Sources of Controversy in the New Restatement of Products Liability: Strict Liability Versus Products Liability, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 10
(1998).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228.
Van Flein, supra note 63, at 30.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231.
See Delany v. Deere and Co., 219 F.3d 1195, 1196 (10th Cir. 2000); Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool, 694 A.2d 1319, 1332 (Conn. 1997); Vautour v. Body Masters Sports
Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178, 1183-84 (N.H. 2001) (criticizing the requirement of a reasonable
alternative design as too restrictive).
232.
See Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword. UnderstandingProducts Liability, 67 CAL. L. REV.
435, 468 (1979); Van Flein, supra note 63, at 29 (stating that "from a practical, trial and evi-
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can establish a reasonable alternative design either by developing a working
prototype, using expert testimony, or comparing the design the manufacturer
adopted3 with similar designs in the same field used by another manufac23
turer.
This contrasts sharply with how plaintiffs can create consumer expectations in a design defect case. Manufacturers, to a significant degree,
create consumer safety expectations through product labeling and advertising.234 The manufacturer who makes false statements about his or her product creates legitimate and reasonable consumer expectations which merit
protection.235 Therefore, instead of having to prove a reasonable alternative
design to prevail under the consumer expectations test, a plaintiff will only
have to assert what is already in public knowledge through product labeling
and advertising. 236 Generally, plaintiffs do not have to bother with the creation of a prototype of the design or with expert testimony on the design's
merit.237 Section 2(b) requires, on the other hand, detailed proof of an alternative design, which is a much2 3larger burden on the plaintiffs case than
showing consumer expectations. 1
Furthermore, risk utility is a negligence-based analysis.2 39 The requirements of "foreseeability" and "reasonableness" in Section 2(b) effectively reconvert the products liability standard from strict liability into one of
negligence.2" By requiring the manufacturer to foresee harm and by requiring the plaintiff to prove a reasonable alternative design, the Restatement
(Third) moved far from the strict liability standard set out in Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second).24 Comment a to the Restatement (Third) Section
1 states that the strict liability rule developed for manufacturing defects is
inappropriate for design and warnings claims.242 The definitions of "defect"
in these cases rely on a reasonableness test traditionally used in determining
whether an actor has been negligent. 243 As a practical matter, the requiredentiary perspective, proof of a safer alternative design would present a more persuasive and
compelling case than one without such proof"); Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d 251, 257
(Tex. 1999) (stating that most states make proof of a reasonable alternative design a prerequisite to a determination of design defectiveness).
233. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d & f (1998).
234.
Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine,
Function and Legal Liabilityfor Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1130-31
(1974).
Rebecca Korzec, Dashing Consumer Hopes: Strict Products Liability and the De235.
mise of the ConsumerExpectations Test, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 227, 240 (1997).
236.
Id. at 241.
237.
Perlman, supra note 41, at 198.
238.
Vargo, supra note 3, at 519.
239.
Perlman, supra note 41, at 197.
Owen, supra note 78, at 285.
240.
241.
Id.
242. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § I cmt. a (1998).
243. Id.
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ment of a reasonable alternative design eliminates any possibility of strict
No longer can the plaintiff assert that the
liability for design defects."
product was not designed according to consumer expectations.245 Instead,
the plaintiff must prove that the manufacturer could foresee the harm and
should have adopted a reasonable alternative design, much like a negligence
claim.246
On the other hand, the consumer expectations test follows the strict
liability principles set forth in Restatement (Second) Section 402A.2 47 The
basic policy of Section 402A was to relieve the plaintiff of the burden of
proving negligence.248 Under the consumer expectations test, the plaintiff
does not have to prove negligence if the harm was foreseeable or if there was
a reasonable alternative design to the product. 249 The consumer expectations
test avoids the economic analysis under the risk utility test and permits the
trier of fact to do what it is best at doing - resolving questions of fairness.
D. Flexibility
One disadvantage to the adoption of the Restatement (Third) is its
lack of flexibility.25 ' The Restatement (Third) collapses the risk utility test,
which typically consist of a number of factors, into a single factor: Was
there a reasonable and safer alternative design at the time the product was
manufactured?25 2 Under a traditional risk utility analysis, the determination
of whether the manufacturer reached a reasonable balance should be flexible. 253 The Minnesota Supreme Court summarized this position in Bilotta v.
Kelley Co., stating, "What constitutes "reasonable care" will, of course, vary
with the surrounding circumstances and will involve a balancing of the likelihood of harm, and the gravity of harm if it happens, against the burden of
the precaution which would be effective to avoid the harm. '254 The adoption
of the Restatement (Third) would eliminate many of the other factors that
courts have taken into account during a traditional risk utility analysis in
favor of one factor, a reasonable alternative design. 5

Westerbeke, supra note 225, at 10.
244.
245.
Owen, supra note 78, at 285.
246. Id. at 285-86.
Vargo, supranote 3, at 538.
247.
Id. at 508.
248.
249.
Phillips, supranote 195, at 1048.
Murrian, supra note 216, at 323.
250.
Michael V. Ciresi & Gary L. Wilson, A Misstatement of Minnesota Products Liability
251.
Law: Why Minnesota Should Reject the Requirement that a PlaintiffProve a Reasonable

Alternative Design, 21
252.
253.
254.

WM. MITCHELL

L. REv. 369, 374-75 (1995).

Id.
Id. at 374.
Bilotta v. Kelley Co., Inc., 346 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Minn. 1984).

255. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. f (1998). The
reporters list traditional risk utility factors, but point out that in most cases, a reasonable alterhttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol3/iss1/7
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In contrast, an advantage of the consumer expectations test is its
flexibility. 56 The plaintiff can prove his case without providing the technical content required under Restatement (Third).257 Additionally, the plaintiff
can argue that a design meeting all state-of-the-art specifications for safety is
still defective if consumers had even higher expectations. 258 If the plaintiff
succeeds, manufacturers will add more safety features to their products, thus
accomplishing the same goal if the case were tried under the risk utility
analysis.259
E. Fairness
There are also concerns that adoption of the Restatement (Third) and
risk utility would at times be unfair to the plaintiff. Generally, a manufacturer stands in a superior position to recognize and cure defects. 2' The Restatement (Third) shifts this burden to the plaintiff, forcing him to create a
reasonable alternative design.26 ' The plaintiff must prove that the hypothetical alternative design would have eliminated or reduced the harm suffered
by the plaintiff. 26 2 Generally, though the manufacturer has access to this
information, it may be difficult for the plaintiff to acquire it. 263 Nevertheless,
the Restatement (Third) requires the plaintiff to introduce information that
the manufacturer could have reduced the plaintiff's harm, a burden that under Section 402A was on the manufacturer. 6
The consumer expectations test also can be unfair to the plaintiff.
The consumer expectations test eliminates liability for dangers that are open
and obvious to consumers, even though it might be thought unreasonable for
a manufacturer not to incorporate precautions against such dangers. 265 For
example, a metal press designed without guards to protect workers might not
be considered reasonably defective even though the absence of the guard is
an obvious danger under the consumer expectations test.26 In contrast, under the risk utility test, the plaintiff could prevail upon showing, for instance,
that other manufacturers of the same product adopted a guard.267

native design is needed to prevail under the Restatement (Third). Id. The factors listed include: The magnitude and probability of foreseeable risks of harm, the instructions and warnings, consumer expectations, and costs of alternative design. Id.
Perlman, supra note 41, at 197.
256.
257. Id.
258. Id.
Korzec, supra note 235, at 238.
259.
Ciresi, supra note 25 1, at 376.
260.
Id.
261.
Id. at 375.
262.
Id. at 376.
263.
Id. at 375-76.
264.
Perlman, supra note 41, at 196.
265.
Id.
266.
Id. at 196-97.
267.
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H. Reasons to Adopt the Restatement (Third)
The Restatement (Third) has been criticized as being too burdensome on the plaintiff.268 Four state supreme court decisions have rejected
Section 2(b) for this reason.2 69 These courts overlook the many cases where
a plaintiff has successfully presented a reasonable alternative design. 270 For
example, in Warner FruehaufTrailer Co., Inc. v. Boston, the plaintiff was
injured after a truck liftgate with a single hydraulic cylinder fell on him. 27,
The plaintiff proposed a back up system with an extra cylinder to prevent the
gate from falling on consumers.272 The court held that the addition of the
second cylinder would
have eliminated the risk, and granted a directed ver27
dict for the plaintiff.
Secondly, the consumer expectations test can at times give the trier
of fact free reign to do anything it wants with a design defect case.274 Using
the consumer expectations test, the trier of fact asks: "What does the consumer expect? 275 Obviously, the consumer expects not to be injured.276 The
268.
Vargo, supra note 3, at 516.
269.
See Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1332 (Conn. 1997) (noting that the feasible alternative design requirement imposes an undue burden on plaintiffs that
might preclude otherwise valid claims from jury consideration); Delany v. Deere & Co., 999
P.2d 930, 944 (Kan. 2000) (holding that Kansas is a consumer expectation state); Vautour v.
Body Masters, Inc., 784 A.2d 1178, 1183 (N.H. 2001) (stating that a reasonable alternative
design should not be a controlling factor or an essential element that must be proved in every
case); Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 751-52 (Wis. 2001) (holding
that Section 2(b) increases the burden for injured consumers not only by requiring proof of
the manufacturer's negligence, but also by adding an additional - and considerable - element
of proof to the negligence standard).
270.
See Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1930) (applying Kentucky law).
In Goullon, the product was a tractor steering wheel made of rubber and fiber that broke in
the driver's hands causing him to fall into the path of the tractor. Id. at 310-11. The reasonable alternative design, a rim made of wood or metal, would not have broken. Id. See also
Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ohio 1975). In Drayton, a drain
cleaner comprised of chemicals that were highly corrosive to human skin injured the plaintiff.
Id. at 1084. A change in the chemical formulation would have made the cleaner better at
cleaning drains and much more safe. Id. at 1085. See also Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So.
2d 299 (Fla. 1956). In Matthews, a moving metal mechanism under the armrest of a lawn
chair amputated the user's finger. Id. at 300. A simple housing could have shielded the
mechanism. Id. at 301. See also Stazenski v. Tennant Co., 617 So. 2d 344 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993). In Stazenski, an industrial machine with a sharp edge cut a worker. Id. at 345.
The sharp edge served no purpose and could easily have been rounded smooth. Id. See also
Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 87 N.E.2d 307 (Ill. App. Ct. 1949). In Lindroth, a vaporizer overheated and caught fire when the water boiled away. Id. at 308. A simple cutoff device could
have prevented the fire. Id. at 309. See also Muller v. A.B. Kirschbaum Co., 148 A. 851 (Pa.
1930). In Muller a commercial coffee urn exploded, injuring the plaintiff. Id. at 852. A
simple reducing valve could have prevented the explosion. Id. at 853.
271.
Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co., Inc. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1273 (D.C. 1995).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1280.
274.
Murrian, supra note 216, at 323.
275.
Henderson, supra note 62, at 22.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol3/iss1/7

30

Sorenson: Reasonable Alternative - Should Wyoming Adopt the Restatment (Thi

2003

COMMENT

consumer's expectation, with regard to how a product will perform, can be
very hard to determine.277 This position is summarized in Denny v. Ford
Motor Co.:
If the test is applied to determine the actual buyer's expectations it can result in imposing absolute liability upon manufacturers and sellers making them insurers of the product's
safety merely because the product did not live up to the consumer's subjective expectations. If the test is used objectively, it is beyond the experience of most lay jurors to determine what an "ordinary consumer" expects or "how safe"
a sophisticated modem product could or should be made to
satisfy those expectations unless the jury is allowed to consider the cost or impracticality of alternative designs or, indeed whether any alternative design for the product was
available.27
Next, although the Restatement (Third) adopted the risk utility test,
the notion of consumer expectations did not disappear entirely.279 Comment
f to Section 2 states that consumer expectations can be a factor in evaluating
whether an alternative design is reasonable or if its omission renders a product not reasonably safe.280 For example, in Crespo v. Chrysler Corp., the
plaintiff sued the manufacturer after her son was killed by an airbag in a
Dodge Caravan.28 ' The plaintiff claimed that the airbag deployed with too
much force and was therefore defectively designed.2" 2 The defendant argued
that decreasing deployment force would decrease the airbag's ability to save
lives.283 Since consumers expect airbags to save lives, decreasing the force
with which they deployed would frustrate consumer expectations in the airbag.2" Therefore, the consumer expectations test, applied within the framework of a risk utility analysis, was the reason why the defendant manufacturer prevailed in that case.28 5
Although consumer expectations remain a factor in some cases dealing with products liability today, the country is clearly moving toward a risk

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id.
Id.
Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 743 (N.Y. 1999) (Simons, J., dissenting).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. f(1998).
Id.
Crespo v. Chrysler Corp., 75 F. Supp. 2d 225, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 229.
Id.
Id. at 232.
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utility approach in products liability cases.286 Admittedly, abandoning consumer expectations as a viable alternative in products liability cases would
mark a departure from the current laws in parts of the country. Nevertheless,
many of the jurisdictions that allow consumer expectations test to be used as
an alternate to risk utility require a reasonable alternative design under the
risk utility portion of their analysis. 287 In Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chemical
Corp., the plaintiffs developed physical symptoms after working with the
defendant's chemicals. 288 The court applied the risk utility test, and while
noting that consumer expectations would be a factor, dismissed the case for
lack of a reasonable alternative design.28 9 Similarly, in Cavanaugh v. Skil
Corp., the plaintiff brought suit after being injured by the defendant's saw. 29
Upon putting the saw down, the saw moved about eighteen inches across the
floor on its own and ran over the plaintiffs foot.29' The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the consumer expectations test, but in this case required the plaintiff to prove a reasonable alternative design.292 The plaintiff
offered a blade break as a safety feature, which would have avoided his injury, and his claim was allowed to go forward.293
The Restatement (Third) is not nearly as flexible as the consumer
expectations test, but neither is it as inflexible as it appears. There are provisions in Restatement (Third) providing for situations when a reasonable alternative design is not required, thereby providing the plaintiff other options
than attempting to prove a reasonable alternative design in every situation.294
One such situation, described in comment e to Section 2, is when a design is
so manifestly unreasonable, such that the product has low social utility and
high risk of danger, that liability attaches without proof of a reasonable alternative design.2 95 An example of this rule is a cigar that is meant to explode with a loud bang and emission of smoke.296 Since this product has
such a low social utility, and the risks of, for example, lighting someone's
286. See Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452 (10th Cir. 1987) (applying Oklahoma
law); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229, 236 (Cal. 1970); Couch v. Mine Safety
Appliances Co., 728 P.2d 585, 587-88 (Wash. 1986).
287. Tannebaum v. Yale Materials Handling Corp., 38 F. Supp. 2d 425 (D. Md. 1999);
Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co., Inc. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1276 (D.C. 1995); Lamkin v.
Towner, 615 N.E.2d 1208, 1211 (111. App. Ct. 1993); Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 527
A.2d 1337, 1341 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987); Cavanaugh v. Skil Corp., 751 A.2d 518, 527
(N.J. 2000); Dewey v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 542 A.2d 919, 923 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1988); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 523 N.E.2d 489, 495
(Ohio 1988); Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chemical Corporation, 7 P.3d 795, 797 (Wash. 2000).
288.
Ruiz-Guzman, 7 P.3d at 796-97.
289.
Id. at 801.
290.
Cavanaugh, 751 A.2d at 519.
291.
Id.
292.
Id. at 522.
293.
Id.
294.
RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF TORTs: PRODUCTs LIABILITY §§ 2 cmt. b & e, 3 (1998).

295.
296.

Id. § 2 cmt. e.
Id. § 2 cmt. e, illus. 5.
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beard on fire are so great, the rule in comment e could be applied, thereby
avoiding the reasonable alternative design requirement.297
Another of the provisions that allows for subversion of the reasonable alternative design requirement is Section 3.298 This section attaches
liability without proof of a specific defect if the "incident that harmed the
'
plaintiff was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect."299
Section 3 can apply to design defect cases, but is limited to situations in
which a product fails to perform its manifestly intended function." The
classic example would be the exploding Coke bottle in Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co.3°' The majority in Escola applied res ipsa loquitur principles
where strict liability principles would be applied today. 302 There would be
no need to prove a reasonable alternative design in that case simply
because
30 3
the product "failed to perform its manifestly intended function.
Use of Section 3 and comment e to Section 2 will probably address
the problem of inherent risk liability. 304 At any rate, courts have not been
very receptive to the idea of inherent risk liability. 3 5 In the rare case that an
inherent risk liability claim is available, all that is necessary for liability under the Restatement (Third) is already known, i.e. the products kill and injure
large numbers of people without providing commensurate benefit or utility. 3 ' A plaintiff can effectively use comment e and Section 3 to the Restatement (Third) when an inherent risk liability case arises. 3 7 No plaintiff
has attempted to use comment e and Section 3 in an inherent risk case; therefore, it is speculation whether these sections would be as effective as the
consumer expectations test in this area.30 8
While adoption of the Restatement (Third) would probably result in
placing a greater burden on the plaintiffs, it is no different than the risk utility test courts have applied in the past.30 9 Courts that have been applying the
297. Id.
298.
Perlman, supra note 41, at 201.
299.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3 (1998).
300. Id. § 3 cmt. b.
301.
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
302. Id. at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
303.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3 cmt. b (1998).
304.
Shupe, supra note 3, at 137.
305.
Only a couple of rare cases fit within the inherent risk category. See, e.g., Halphen v.
Johns Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986) (litigating asbestos claims); Kelley v.
R.G. Industries, Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985) (litigating claims involving the saturday
night special handgun).
306.
Westerbeke, supra note 225, at 10.
307. Id.
308.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 2 cmt. e, reporter's
notes, 3 reporter's notes.
309.
See Joseph W. Little, The Place of Consumer Expectations in Product Strict Liability
Actions for Defectively DesignedProducts, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1189 (1994) (noting that while
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risk utility test have used the "reasonableness" and "foreseeability" terms
even before the publication of Restatement (Third).3" ' For example, in
Anderson v. Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp., the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant failed to warn about the dangers of its asbestos related product. 3,,
The defendant manufacturer claimed that it complied with all of the state-ofthe-art methods at the time and therefore the plaintiffs injuries were not
foreseeable." The court held for the defendant and stated that "knowledge,
actual or constructive, is a requisite for strict liability."3 3'
Although adoption of the Restatement (Third) may, at times, make it
more difficult for the plaintiff to prove its case, it is a better alternative than
the consumer expectations test. Consumer expectations, standing alone, do
not take into account whether the proposed alternative design could be implemented at a reasonable cost, or whether an alternative design would provide greater overall safety.314 Even proponents of the consumer expectations
test note that it does not constitute an independent standard for judging the
defectiveness of product designs, and is best used as an element in the risk
utility analysis.3" ' Reasons for this assertion include the difficulty in determining consumer expectations, the problems in complex design cases, and
the potential for inconsistent results.316
An example of the inconsistent results that the consumer expectations sometimes can produce is found in Newman v. Ford Motor Co., decided in 1998. 3'" The plaintiffs sued after their Ford Aerostar was rear ended
by a truck and the front seat mechanism collapsed.3 " The issue before the
court was whether the seat mechanism should have been more rigid, or
whether the design, as it existed, constituted the appropriate design.31 9 On
the one hand, rigid design is good for a very high speed.32 ° On the other
hand, a non-rigid design is much safer for slow speeds. 32' The court applied
the consumer expectations test and held for the plaintiff.322 The problem
with this decision lies in the reasoning the Missouri Supreme Court used to
arrive at its conclusion. Under the consumer expectations test, a plaintiff
injured at high speed would have the expectations that the seat would hold.
courts often espouse the language of strict liability, they are really applying negligence principles when using the risk utility test).
310. Owen, supra note 78, at 286.
311.
810 P.2d 549, 550 (Cal. 1991).
312. Id. at 551.
313.

Id. at 557.

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Phillips, supra note 195, at 1048.
Id.; Murrian supranote 216, at 323.
Murrian, supra note 216, at 324.
975 S.W.2d 147 (Mo. 1998).
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id. at 152.
Id.

322.

Id. at 154.
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Conversely, a plaintiff at a low speed would have the expectation that the
seat would not hold because there is a lesser risk for injury with a non-rigid
design at a low speed.323 The difficulty for the manufacturer is that it cannot
design the seat both ways to meet consumer expectations.3 24 The consumer
expectations test, therefore, allows conflicting answers to questions that
ought to have one sensible answer under the law.325
III. Wyoming and the Adoption of the Restatement (Third)
Wyoming has yet to adopt one test or the other in its design defect
Adoption of Section 2(b) for design defect cases would allow
Wyoming to conform to the national trend.3 27 The Wyoming Supreme Court
has already discussed the Restatement (Third)'s position, as well as the exceptions to the reasonable alternative design requirement, but has failed to
take a position.12 ' This isprobably a result of a number of factors, one of
which is the sheer lack of products liability cases that arise in Wyoming.329
Another is the previous reluctance of the Wyoming court to accept changes
in products liability law.33 Finally, adoption of the Restatement (Third)
would mark a change in Wyoming law.33 ' All of these factors would weigh
into the court's decision whether to adopt the Restatement (Third).
cases.3 26

In reality, the Wyoming Supreme Court has not been confronted
with the right fact situation to adopt the Restatement (Third). In Campbell v.
Studer, Inc., the issue was not the design itself, but the existence of a defect.33 2 There was no reason to apply a test, and therefore the court only
gave the Restatement (Third) footnote treatment.3 " The court noted, "We
need not enter the debate [over Restatement (Third) Section 2(b)] at this time
323. Henderson, supra note 62, at 23.
324. Id.
325.
Id.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 173-75.
327. See Warner Freuhauf Trailer Co., Inc., v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1276 (D.C. 1995)
("In design defect cases, most jurisdictions decide [strict liability in tort] by using some form
of risk-utility balancing test."). See also Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 673
(Ga. 1994); Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Ky. 1980); St.
Germain v. Husqvarna Corp., 544 A.2d 1283, 1285 (Me. 1988); Sperry-New Holland v.
Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 255 (Miss. 1993) (noting that risk utility has become the trend in
most federal and state jurisdictions); Foley v. Clark Equip. Co., 523 A.2d 379 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987); Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377, 386 (Tex. 1998).
Campbell v. Studer, Inc., 970 P.2d 389, 392 n.1 (Wyo. 1998).
328.
329.
See id.; Covington v. W.R. Grace-Conn Inc., 952 P.2d 1105 (Wyo. 1998). These
cases represent the only two products liability cases to arise in Wyoming since the Restatement (Third)'s publication.
See Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 341 (Wyo. 1986) (noting that the
330.
court has declined to adopt strict liability on a number of occasions prior to 1986, some
twenty-five years after Section 402A's publication).
331.
Id. at 341.
332. Campbell, 970 P.2d at 395.
Id. at 392 n.1.
333.
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because Campbell's allegations clearly rest on her contention that a feasible
alternative design was available. 334 Although Covington v. W.R. GraceConn, Inc. was a design defect case, the court decided it under a real estate
statute; again, no test was needed. 335 There have not been any cases in
WyoWyoming since Covington and Campbell that would have enabled the336
(Third).
Restatement
the
on
position
any
adopt
to
Court
ming Supreme
Wyoming has also had been reluctant to accept change in the product liability arena. Until 1986, the Wyoming Supreme Court had numerous
occasions to adopt the Restatement (Second) Section 402A but failed to do
so.33 1 If history is any example, it appears that the court will need a perfect
fact scenario before adopting a new position in a products liability case.338
Additionally, before Section 402A was adopted, most plaintiffs only pursued
negligence theories in products liability, which did not present the court with
opportunities to change the law. 339 For these reasons, the Wyoming Supreme Court has been reluctant to alter the state of products liability law.
Admittedly, the adoption the Restatement (Third) would mark a departure for Wyoming law.3"" Wyoming completely adopted Section 402A in
1986, including all of the comments, and has made no modifications since
then.34' Adoption of the Restatement (Third) would require the court to decide 2on which test to employ in a design defect case, something it has yet to
34
do.
A test is needed, if for no other reason than to inform plaintiffs about
how to prove their case.343 Adoption of Restatement (Third), with its requirement of a reasonable alternative design, would help in that respect. It is
also a better alternative than the consumer expectations test. Adoption of
the Restatement (Third) would be consistent with the trend in the rest of the

334. Id.
335.
Covington v. W.R. Grace-Conn, Inc., 952 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Wyo. 1998).
336.
See Vargo, supra note 3, at 948-49.
337.
See O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1985); Buckley v. Bell, 703
P.2d 1089 (Wyo. 1985); Herman v. Speed King Mfg. Co., 675 P.2d 1271 (Wyo. 1984);
Caldwell v. Yamaha Motor Co., 648 P.2d 519 (Wyo. 1982); Wells v. Jeep Corp., 532 P.2d
595 (Wyo. 1975); Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 527 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1974).
338.
See Buckley, 703 P.2d at 1094-95 (listing numerous examples of why the court did
not adopt Section 402A at the time).
339.
See Herman, 675 P.2d at 1276; Wells, 532 P.2d at 597; Maxted, 527 P.2d at 833;
Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 341 (Wyo. 1986).
340.
341.
Id.; Vargo, supra note 3, at 948-49.
Vargo, supra note 3, at 948.
342.
343.
Id. at 949.
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slowly be coming around to the position taken in
country, which appears to
3
the Restatement (Third). "
CONCLUSION

The Restatement (Third) of Torts: ProductsLiability has tremendous
potential to establish a more uniform body of products liability law. 345 The
adoption of Section 2(b) would be a positive change for Wyoming because
Wyoming has no established test for deciding design defect cases.3 46 Adoption would also be consistent with the trend throughout the rest of the country.W Many states already apply the Restatement (Third) without expressly
adopting it, but the process of adoption is likely to be a slow one.3 4 Adoption of the Restatement (Third) would clarify a difficult area of the law and
give the plaintiffs an idea of what is needed in order to be successful in a
design defect case. Adoption of the Restatement (Third) is truly a reasonable alternative.
MATTHEW R. SORENSON

344.
courts
345.
346.
347.
348.

See generally Henderson, supra note 2 (explaining the status of the Section 2(b) in the
around the country and finding it is slowly gaining acceptance).
Shupe, supra note 3, at 150.
Vargo, supra note 3, at 949.
See Henderson, supra note 2.
I
Id.
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